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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property provisions are standard when it comes to trade 
agreements. 1 Trade agreements and intellectual property standards are 
advanced together because intellectual property standards are said fair 
competition and provide for adequate and effective protection and enforcement, 
thus eliminating a major trade barrier. 2  
During his presidential campaign, President Trump named fair trade deals 
and pharmaceutical drug pricing, among others, as his priorities during his 
presidency. 3  Initially, the President named intellectual property as one of the 
driving forces behind his trade negotiations, focusing his concern on protecting 
the intellectual property produced by the citizens of the United States from 
foreign countries’ fraudulent behavior. 4  President Trump has also promised to 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank my parents 
for their constant support during my time in law school.  
1.  See James M. Silbermann, The North American Free Trade Agreement’s Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Patents: A bitter Pill to Swallow or a Therapeutic Solution?, 12 J. Contem. Health L. 
& Pol’y 607, 608 (1996). 
2. See Id.  
3. See President Donald Trump, State of the Union Address, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800064/pdf/DCPD-201800064.pdf, (Jan. 30, 2018). 
4. Executive Summary from Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, The President’s 2018 Trade 
Policy Agenda, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf 
(Mar. 2018). [hereinafter The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda}. 
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lower pharmaceutical prices for Americans.  In 2018 the United States spent an 
estimated 335 billion on pharmaceutical drugs, this number is anticipated to 
grow to 345.7 billion by the end of 2019 and 358.7 billion by the end of 2020.5 
This level of spending makes the United States the top spender on 
pharmaceuticals in the world. 6 Because of this, President Trump has made the 
promise to lower the price of pharmaceutical spending. 7 
 Throughout his presidency, President Trump has sought to deliver on his 
campaign promises, by drastically changing the United States’ presence in 
numerous trade deals. 8 He has accomplished this through withdrawing from 
current trade deals, renegotiating others, and forming new trade deals 
altogether. 9  A major withdrawal came within the first day of his term when he 
withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. 10 Another 
notable change was the abandonment of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiation of its replacement, the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). 11 
 Given this change, President Trump has also played an outsized role in 
changing intellectual property law since trade agreements may have a 
subsidiary effect of changing substantive nature. 12 For example, the USMCA 
included sixty-five pages of intellectual property provisions, that expanded 
provisions previously included in agreements, such as TPP and NAFTA. 13 
Indeed, it may be that President Trump’s intellectual property goals—such as 
lower prescription drug prices—might be undermined by the ripple effects of 
his agreement.  
Section one of this Comment will analyze the promises President Trump 
has made during his term, focusing on trade reform and pharmaceutical drug 
prices.  Section two of this Comment will demonstrate the disparity between 
 
5. Prescription Drug Expenditure in the U.S. 1960-2019, SATISTA.COM (2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184914/prescription-drug-expenditures-in-the-us-since-1960/. 




7. State of the Union Address, supra note 3.   
8. See President Donald Trump, President Trump’s First Weekly Address, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700078/pdf/DCPD-201700078.pdf, (Jan. 28, 2017).  
9. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
10. President Donald Trump, President Trump’s First Weekly Address, supra note 6. 
11. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20, Proposed Draft, Nov. 30, 2018. [https://perma.cc/M3YZ-
974N].  
12. See Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in International 
Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 277, 283 
(2001).  
13. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20, Dec. 13, 2019. 
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the promises made and the proposed provisions of the USMCA.  Further, 
showing how the lack of intellectual property expertise during trade 
negotiations will prevent President Trump from fulfilling his promise to lower 
pharmaceutical drug prices.  Finally, section three of this Comment will argue 
in favor of mandating that the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) be present during trade negotiations, in hopes of, in the future, being 
able to accomplish goals for trade without negatively impacting consumers 
through intellectual property changes.   
II.  PROMISES MADE 
Every presidential candidate makes promises and sets goals for their term.  
The overwhelming theme of President Trump’s promises is this: America 
first.14 President Trump promised to accomplish this through extensive trade 
reform and lowering pharmaceutical drug prices.  This section will analyze 
these promises and how President Trump intends to carry them out.  
During President Trump’s inaugural address, he said, “Every decision on 
trade . . . will be made to benefit American workers and American families. . . . 
America will start winning again, winning like never before.”15 During his first 
day in office, President Trump withdrew from the TPP, deeming it “a disastrous 
deal for our workers” and vowing to pursue one-on-one deals that protect 
Americans. 16 Within his first two years of office, NAFTA had been abandoned 
and made way for the newly negotiated USMCA. 17 In the 2018 State of the 
Union address, President Trump exclaimed that “America has . . . finally turned 
the page on decades of unfair trade deals. . . . From now on, we expect trading 
relationships to be fair and, very importantly, reciprocal.”18 These are just a few 
examples of how President Trump has committed to his promise of trade 
reform.  
A significant overlap exists between intellectual property and trade reform. 
It is clear that the Trump Administration recognizes this intersection.  In 2018, 
the White House published a thirty-three-page document explaining the 
President’s trade policy agenda. 19 This agenda highlights five major pillars 
driving President Trump’s trade negotiations. 20 Two of these five pillars 
involve intellectual property. 21 The first pillar is supporting our national 
 
14.  See President Donald Trump, Inaugural Address, (Jan. 20, 2017). 
15. Inaugural Address, supra note 14.  
16. First weekly address, supra note 8. 
17. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20, Proposed Draft, supra note 11.  
18. State of the Union, supra note 3. 
19. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4.  
20. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
21. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
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security, stating that the national security strategy relies heavily on the United 
States “preserv[ing] our lead in research and technology and protect[ing] our 
economy from competitors who unfairly acquire our intellectual property.”22 
The second pillar, that involves intellectual property, is “negotiating trade deals 
that work for all Americans.”23 This pillar particular refers to the need to reform 
NAFTA. 24 The trade agenda states that the renegotiation of NAFTA has two 
primary goals: 1) to “[i]mprove the U.S. trade balance and reduce the trade 
deficit with the NAFTA countries;” and, 2) to bring the provisions concerning 
digital trade, intellectual property, and cybersecurity into the 21st century. 25 
In addition, the USTR publishes a Special 301 Report every year that 
further emphasizes the importance of intellectual property during trade deals. 
26 This report states, “[o]ne of the top priorities for the Trump Administration 
is to . . . provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of U.S. 
intellectual property [] rights.”27 The special 301 report is an annual review of 
intellectual property protection and enforcement in United States trading 
partners. 28 The purpose of the report is to call out and expose harmful 
intellectual property practices by other countries. 29 These reports are not 
unique to the Trump Administration, and intellectual property has been a main 
priority of the USTR for some time. 30  
The mention of intellectual property in both the trade agenda and the 
Special 301 Reports demonstrates that the Trump Administration recognizes 
that intellectual property protection goes hand in hand with trade negotiations. 
31 In fact, intellectual property is a key selling point when it comes to dealings 
with many United States trading partners. 32 But, despite the great importance 
placed on intellectual property, there is a fundamental lacking of intellectual 
property knowledge among the President, the USTR, and the general American 
public, which leads to unfulfilled goals and promises. 
 
22. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
23. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
24. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
25. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
26. OFF. OF U.S. TR. REP., Special 301 Rep. (2017); see also, OFF. OF U.S. TR. REP., Special 301 
Rep. (2018). 
27. Special 301 Rep., supra note 26. 
28. Special 301 Rep., supra note 26. 
29. Special 301 Rep., supra note 26. 
30. Special 301 Rep., supra note 26. 
31. See OFF. OF U.S. TR. REP., Special 301 Rep. (2017); See also, Executive Summary from 
Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda (Mar. 2018). 
32. Limits of informal reg, supra note 12. 
CARTER_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:22 PM 
2020] TRADE DEALS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 57 
 
III.  PROMISES IN PLACE?  
This administration has moved quickly to make changes and to effectuate 
promises of the President. Within his first week in office, President Trump 
began working on his promise of trade reform. 33 This section will analyze the 
disconnect between the promises made and the policy that has been put into 
effect. This section will also explain that the disconnect resulted from a lack of 
intellectual property understanding.  Although President Trump has worked on 
numerous trade agreements,34 this section will primarily focus on the USMCA.  
The USMCA is a trilateral agreement between the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada. 35 This agreement replaced NAFTA, which President Trump 
deemed to be “the worst trade deal ever made.”36 President Trump claims the 
USMCA is “the most advanced trade deal in the world with ambitious 
provisions on . . . patents.”37 The goal of the USMCA was to bring trade 
agreements into the 21st century and set forth a template for future trade 
agreements under the Trump Administration. 38 President Trump stated that the 
USMCA embodies three pillars that he hopes will drive trade negotiations in 
the future, including: fairness; “ambitious provisions on digital trade; 
intellectual property; [and] services . . . designed to protect our competitive 
edge”; and, new provisions designed to eliminate unfair trading practices. 39  
The proposed draft of the USMCA contained sixty-four pages of 
intellectual property provisions, some of which resemble the provisions 
proposed by the United States in the TPP, some of which are the same as 
NAFTA, and some that are new altogether. 40 Notably, the USMCA includes a 
number of provisions that may undermine a key element of the Trump agenda 
in intellectual property policy: the lowering of prescription drug prices.  A 
primary example of this is when President Trump promised during his 2018 
State of the Union address, “One of my greatest priorities is to reduce the price 
of prescription drugs. . . . And prices will come down substantially. Watch.”41 
Lowering pharmaceutical drug prices is something most American’s yearn for.  
 
33. First weekly address, supra note 8.  
34. See Executive Summary from Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, The President’s 2018 
Trade Policy Agenda (Mar. 2018). See also, Executive Summary from Ambassador Robert E. 
Lighthizer, The President’s 2019 Trade Policy Agenda (Mar. 2019). 
35. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
36. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
37. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
38. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
39. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
40. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, PUBLICCITIZEN.ORG, 
(Jan. 21. 2019), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/nafta-2.0-pharmaceutical-related-patent-
provisions.pdf.  
41. State of the Union, supra note 3. 
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It has been found that many American’s have opted to forego prescribed 
medication due to high prices and the inability to pay. 42 However, President 
Trump anticipates being able to lower drug prices through providing “speed 
access to breakthrough cures and affordable generic drugs,” citing that “last 
year, the FDA approved more new and generic drugs . . . than ever before.”43 
This is a promise that President Trump believes, is an economic issue that can 
be solved through agency expediency. 44 However, pharmaceutical drug 
pricing, at its core, is an intellectual property issue that has now been affected 
by the provisions set forth in the numerous trade negotiations.45 
The proposed draft of the USMCA included a number of provisions that 
impact pharmaceutical drugs and biologics, including, patentable subject 
matter and secondary patents, patent term extension, market exclusivity for 
small molecules and biologics, and patent linkage. 46 Patents provide their 
owner with the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention throughout the United States.”47 Therefore, so long as 
the brand pharmaceutical companies own the patents, they have an exclusive 
monopoly over that pharmaceutical drug.  This limits generic manufacturers 
from offering more affordable alternatives, in turn keeping pharmaceutical drug 
prices high. 48 The proposed provisions involving pharmaceuticals and 
biologics contained in the USMCA are pharma-friendly. 49 Meaning, they 
provide exclusivity that favors pharmaceutical manufacturers. 50 The inclusion 
of these pharma-friendly provisions highlights the disconnect between 
President Trump’s promise to lower pharmaceutical drug prices and the 
negotiation of this trade agreement.  
Ultimately, several of the proposed provisions that impacted 
pharmaceutical drug pricing were removed from the agreement because these 
provisions were not approved by Congress.51 The House of Representatives 
noted in their report: 
The USMCA, as originally negotiated, would have locked-in practices 
that lead to high drug prices [and] hindered the generic competition that 
 
42. National trends per capita, supra note 6. 
43. State of the Union, supra note 3. 
44. State of the Union, supra note 3. 
45. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
46. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20.48(2), Proposed Draft, supra note 11. 
47. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), (2013). 
48. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
49. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
50. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
51. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, pt. 1(b) at 10 (2019). 
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brings down prices. . . . The [revised] Agreement now preserves 
Congress’s power to pass laws that bring down high prescription drug 
costs. … The [revised] Agreement creates a balance between 
encouraging the competition that brings greater access to medicines at 
lower costs to patients and supporting pharmaceutical innovation.52  
Even though many of the “pharma-friendly” provisions were removed from 
the agreement, it is important to understand how these provisions would have 
prevented the President from delivering on his promise to lower pharmaceutical 
drug patents.  Understanding how trade negotiations impact substantive law 
highlights the need for expert advisers to be present during trade negotiations.  
Article 20.36 of the proposed USMCA allows for patents, including 
pharmaceutical patents, on new uses of known products, new methods of using 
known products, or new processes of known products. 53 Obtaining a new 
patent for a slight change to a known invention is typically known as 
evergreening. 54 The objective of evergreening is to “extend the life of patent 
protection through patenting [] minor changes in active pharmaceutical 
ingredients of existing pharmaceutical products . . . , inert ingredients, 
formulations, dosages, and combinations.”55 The provision has since been 
removed from the agreement. 56 In the December 19, 2019 House Report, it 
noted, “[t]his provision would have locked in the practice of ‘patent 
evergreening,’ in which pharmaceutical companies . . . [can] block generic 
competition and price reductions.”57 The provision had to be removed in order 
to align the goal of lowering pharmaceutical prices with the effect the 
provisions would have on intellectual property law.  
In addition to the broader subject-matter provisions, the proposed USMCA 
also provided for market exclusivity regardless of patent status. 58 Article 
20.48(2)(a), provided three years of additional market exclusivity even to 
previously approved pharmaceutical products that cover a new indication, 
formula, or method of administration. 59 This would be considered another form 
of evergreening, because slight modifications, even to off-patent medicines, 
would result in three additional years of protection, which would prevent 
generic competitors from entering the market.  This provision has since been 
 
52. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
53. See U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20.36, Proposed Draft, supra note 11. 
54. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40.  
55. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
56. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
57. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, pt. 1(b) at 10 (2019), supra note 51.  
58. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40.  
59. See U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20.48(2), Proposed Draft, supra note 11. 
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removed from the agreement, the House Report indicating that removal of this 
provision was necessary to avoid locking the United States into patent 
evergreening. 60  
Article 20.49 of the proposed draft broadens the definition of biologics. 61 
Currently 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) defines a biological product as meaning “a 
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized 
polypeptide), or analogous product, . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, 
or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.”62 The proposed USMCA 
broadened this definition to include any products that are or contains any of the 
components listed above. 63 The broadening of this provision potentially 
subjects more biological products to monopoly control. 64 If more products fall 
under monopoly control, then fewer generic competitors can enter the 
marketplace, resulting in high drug prices. 65 The scope of this provision 
contradicts President Trump’s promise to lower drug prices.  
The proposed USMCA, also, would lock the United States into market 
exclusivity of both pharmaceutical drugs and biologics. 66 Market exclusivity 
means that no other manufacturer may be permitted to market a similar drug 
for five years. The market exclusivity provision for biologics contained in 
article 20.49, provides for a term of ten years.67  Market exclusivity provisions 
create additional delays to a generic alternative’s entrance to the market. 68 All 
references to biologics, including those in the market exclusivity provisions, 
have since been removed from the agreement. 69 The House Report indicated 
that biologics “are some of the most expensive drugs on the market,” and 
providing at least ten years of market exclusivity for biologics would not allow 
Congress any space to create policies that would drive down the high price of 
biologics.70 
The minority of the House Report noted that they believed the majority’s 
interpretation of the effects of including provisions on biologics was incorrect. 
 
60. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
61. See U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20.49, Proposed Draft supra note 11.  
62. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1), (2017). 
63. See U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, §20.49, Proposed Draft, supra note 11. 
64. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
65. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
66. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement, § 20.48-20.49, Proposed Draft supra note 11. 
67. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement, § 20.49, Proposed Draft supra note 11.  
68. U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement, § 20.49, Proposed Draft supra note 11. 
69. U.S-Mex.-Can. Agreement, supra note 13. 
70. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
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71 The minority explained that the provisions would not increase drug prices 
and that remaining silent on the issue of biologics only allows for a lower level 
of protection. 72 The disagreement among members in the House is another 
reason that an expert in intellectual property should be present during trade 
negotiations. An expert’s familiarity with the current law and knowledge of 
how proposed provisions would affect, both, the law and the market is a way to 
ensure that the United States is meeting the expectations of its constituents and 
still promoting innovation.  
Article 20.51 of the proposed USMCA linked the marketing approval 
process to the status of the patent. 73 This creates a barrier for generic 
competitors because it provides for notification to the original patent holder 
when a competitor is seeking to register for market approval. 74 This provides 
the original patent holder with notice and time to file an infringement suit 
against any competitors. 75 The financial benefit the original pharmaceutical 
manufacturer receives by deterring competitors incentivizes litigation and, in 
turn, deters generic competitors from attempting to enter the market. 76 This 
provision has since been removed from the agreement in an effort to incentivize 
generic competition that the original provision would have discouraged. 77  
As discussed previously, many of the provisions included in the draft of the 
USMCA do not drastically alter United States intellectual property law.  
However, signing those provisions into an agreement would have prevented the 
United States from future reform. 78 When President Trump signed what he 
deemed to be “the most modern, up-to-date, and balanced trade agreement in 
the history of our country,” he also signed off on numerous provisions that 
would not have lowered pharmaceutical prices. 79 Many of the pharma-friendly 
provisions have since been removed from the agreement, and now the 
agreement better aligns with the goals of promoting innovation and lowering 
pharmaceutical prices. 80 However, as indicated above, there was some 
disagreement as to the actual impact that these provisions would have and if 
their removal was necessary. 81 Intellectual property is a technical field of the 
 
71. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
72. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
73. See United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, §20.51, Proposed Draft, (Nov. 30, 2018). 
74. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
75. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
76. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
77. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
78. NAFTA 2.0 Chapter 20 Pharmaceutical-Related Patent Provisions, supra note 40. 
79. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on U.S.-Mex.-Can. Agreement.  
80. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
81. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51. 
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law and, as such, any agreements that would impact intellectual property should 
be assessed or advised by an expert.  Although Congress was ultimately able to 
better align the provisions of the USMCA with the goals of the President, 
having an expert present during trade negotiations would allow for trade 
agreements to align with our nation’s goals from the start.  
IV.  HOW TO RECONCILE THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PROMISES MADE AND 
PROMISES KEPT? 
The lack of understanding demonstrated by the disconnect between 
President Trump’s promise to lower drug prices and the signing off on pharma-
friendly intellectual property provisions is an issue that is prevalent in 
intellectual property policy.  Most people do not possess a technical 
understanding of intellectual property law.  Yet often times, intellectual 
property policy decisions are made during trade negotiations by people like 
President Trump and officers and advisors from the USTR.  That is why this 
section will discuss the importance of amending the enumerated powers of the 
USPTO to include a mandatory presence at trade negotiations that involve 
intellectual property.  
Trade agreements have a ripple effect, once they are enacted they impact 
the market and can result in substantive changes to existing laws. 82 An example 
of substantive US law being changed as a result of trade agreements is in 1993 
the United States entered into the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) agreement. 83 After negotiations were completed, the United 
States had to impose additional infringement liability to cover “offers to sell.”84 
In 1994 the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) was amended to reflect 
the terms of the TRIPS agreement. 85 The proposed provisions of the USMCA 
would have also had a ripple effect—the provisions, as drafted, would have 
locked the United States into practices that would limit generic competition and 
lead to high pharmaceutical prices. 86 The effect the proposed provisions would 
have had highlights the issue that goals are not being met during negotiations.  
Intellectual property is an important part of the law and is recognized as 
such.  Not only has intellectual property been listed as a main priority of the 
USTR because it is a driving force behind most trade negotiations, but it also 
affects several other areas of the economy. 87 Intellectual property has also been 
 
82. Cheek, supra note 8.  
83. TRIPS agreement, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.  
84. Rotec Indus. V. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
85. Id.  
86. H.R. REP NO. 116-358, supra note 51.  
87. See OFF. OF U.S. TR. REP., Special 301 Rep., supra note 26. 
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cited by the President as a priority for his administration. 88 Intellectual property 
policy is something that effects all Americans, even if they are unaware of the 
inner workings of intellectual property.  Americans are asking for change when 
it comes to pharmaceutical prices and want the government to deliver on that; 
one way of doing so is through intellectual property provisions in trade 
agreements. 
The disconnect this Comment presents, between what President Trump 
promised and the proposed provisions of the USMCA, is just one example.  
That is why it is important to amend the enumerated powers of the USPTO to 
include being present at trade negotiations.  This change is necessary to ensure 
that intellectual property provisions align with the goals set forth, do not 
substantively change intellectual property policy and are carefully weighed 
against the potential effects on other areas of the economy.  
Currently, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(8)-(10) states that the USPTO involvement in 
trade negotiations is strictly advisory. 89 This means intellectual property is not 
being created by intellectual property experts, but rather, it is being created by 
USTR negotiators and lawmakers. 90 The USPTO was tasked with the advisory 
role because Congress wanted to maintain a policy link between intellectual 
property experts and their lawmaking counterparts. 91 During the USMCA 
negotiations, the USPTO assisted by “providing extensive information on the 
state of intellectual property protection and enforcement in many countries.”92 
However, providing information and being present during negotiations to 
ensure the provisions are meeting all goals and expectations are very different.  
Patent practice is a technical skill that requires licensing through the 
USPTO. Currently, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) does not have a single member that is registered with the USPTO. 93 
The position of Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property Negotiator is left 
empty. 94 The acting Assistant United States Representative for Innovation and 
Intellectual Property is not a registered patent practitioner. 95 The USTR has 
 
88. The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, supra note 4. 
89. 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(8)-(10), (2011). 
90. Cheek,  supra note 8.  
91. Omnibus Patent Act 1997, Senate Report 105-42, page 32,105-42, 
https://www.congress.gov/105/crpt/srpt42/CRPT-105srpt42.pdf. 
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CARTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:22 PM 
64 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:1 
 
advisory committees that report on the drafted provisions after the fact. 96 In the 
report on intellectual property, the committee raised many concerns that aligned 
with the concerns expressed by Congress during their hearing for ratification of 
the agreement. 97 However, many of these concerns were not addressed until 
Congress removed the provisions of concern more than a year later. 98 Although 
some of the officials present during negotiations may have familiarity with 
patents and intellectual property, nobody sitting in on these trade deals has 
adequate expertise to be drafting intellectual property provisions.  
The lack of experts during the negotiation of the USMCA resulted in an 
agreement that would have rendered President Trump unable to deliver on the 
promise to lower pharmaceutical drug prices.  Pharmaceutical drug prices 
would not have been lowered because the intellectual property provisions 
included in the proposed USMCA, involving pharmaceutical drugs and 
biologics, locked the United States into long patent terms, market exclusivity 
and other methods of favoring brand name pharmaceutical companies. 99 This, 
in turn, would have kept generic drugs off the market for longer, keeping the 
price of pharmaceuticals high. 100 Congress was able to amend the agreement 
to better align with the goals the President had in mind, however, that still 
resulted in disagreement among parties. 101 Intellectual property is a technical 
field and experts should be the ones who are creating, advising, and informing 
lawmakers and negotiators on intellectual property provisions.  
As discussed above, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(8)-(10) states that the USPTO 
involvement in trade negotiations is strictly advisory. 102 This advisory role is 
carried out by providing “technical assistance” by way of providing 
information to the USTR regarding intellectual property law. 103 This is not 
enough to ensure that the way policy is created aligns with the importance 
placed on the policy after it is created.  It is not enough to ensure that the policy 
aligns with the goals for that policy.  That is why the statute should be amended 
to mandate the USPTO’s presence during trade negotiations that involve 
intellectual property policy. 
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Mandating the USPTO’s presence during trade negotiations is one way to 
ensure that trade deals accurately reflect the goals they intended to achieve and 
that the ripple effect of the trade agreement will not impact the current law.  In 
1997 the USPTO became an independent government corporation. 104 Prior to 
this the USPTO was a subsidiary agency of the Department of Commerce. 105 
The push to make the USPTO a separate entity arose out of wanting to increase 
efficiency administering patents. 106  Despite becoming an independent 
government corporation, Congress maintained the policy link between the 
USPTO and the Department of Commerce. 107 This was done so that the 
USPTO could advise and inform on policy that dealt with intellectual property 
law. 108 It is clear that the maintenance of this policy link was because Congress 
recognized that the USPTO are the experts in the intellectual property field and 
should be the ones helping to create and advise on intellectual property law. 109 
Twenty years ago, Congress was right to maintain a policy link between the 
USPTO and the Department of Commerce.  They knew that it was the experts 
who needed to be the ones counseling and informing policy changes.  If 
intellectual property policy is as important to the USTR, the President and trade 
agreements as it appears to be, then the way intellectual property policy is 
handled during trade negotiations should not be enough for the USTR, the 
President or Americans.  One way to ensure that trade agreements have a 
limited ripple effect on current laws, effectuates the promises made by the 
President to the people, and still meets the goals of intellectual property law, is 
to mandate the presence of the USPTO at trade negotiations.  Mandating the 
USPTO’s presence during trade negotiations would mean not having to rely on 
after the fact changes to provisions to ensure that the United States’ needs are 
being met.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
President Trump said during his inaugural address, “I will fight for you with 
every breath in my body, and I will never, ever let you down.”110 However, that 
fight, the fight for the American people requires experts’ knowledge and 
understanding.  It is impossible to ask one office to provide all the expertise 
necessary to fulfill every promise made.  Mandating the USPTO’s presence 
during trade negotiations supports the President’s fight and will benefit 
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CARTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:22 PM 
66 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:1 
 
American consumers by allowing the President to deliver on his promises.  
Although the USMCA was eventually revised to better align with the 
President’s promises, mandating the USPTO’s presence during trade 
negotiations will be a more effective way to align intellectual property 
provisions with their intended effect.  Therefore, the current statute 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 2(b)(8)-(10) should be amended to require the USPTO be present during 
trade negotiations when intellectual property is involved.  The convergence of 
the USTR’s trade expertise with the USPTO’s intellectual property expertise 
will allow for trade negotiations to better meet the needs of consumers on all 
fronts and will better position the President to fulfill his promises to and fight 
for the American people.  
 
